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Regulating Immigration in a Global Age: A New Policy Landscape1
Saskia Sassen
Immigration policy is deeply embedded in the question of state sovereignty and
the inter-state system. But the state itself has been transformed by the growth of a
global economic system and other transnational processes. These have brought on
conditions that bear on the state’s regulatory role and its autonomy. As a result, it is
no longer sufficient simply to assert the sovereign role of the state in immigration policy
design and implementation; it is necessary to examine also the transformation of the
state itself and what that can entail for migration policy and the regulation of
migration flows and settlement. A similar argument can be made for the inter-state
system.
The major implication for immigration policy is that these developments have had an
impact on the sovereignty of the state and its capacity for unilateral action. The reality
of economic globalization has forced states to learn how to be more multilateral. This is
most clearly evident in the activities of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in
the handling of global financial crises. Both the impact on the state’s sovereignty
and the state’s participation in the new global economic system have transformed the
state itself, affected the power of different agencies within it, and furthered the
internationalization of the inter-state system through a proliferation of bi- and
multilateral agreements. Yet immigration policy in most of the highly developed
countries has not been marked by major innovations as we have seen in other policy
realms.
Here I examine three of the key features of the immigration policy framework in
the highly developed countries in the light of these transformations in the state and
the inter-state system, particularly those brought on by globalization. These three
key features are: a) the handling of immigration as a process autonomous from
other processes and policy domains, b) the handling of immigration as a
unilateral sovereign matter, and c) taking the state as a given, untouched by
the massive domestic and international transformations within which the state
operates.
This is, clearly, a somewhat stylized account of the major features of immigration
policy. It abstracts and in so doing, leaves out multiple details. But it gets close to
its heart. Let me address each of these features by noting their growing
incompatibility with the broader transformation underway and what needs to be
done.
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1. More recognition of interaction effects
Elsewhere, I have argued strenuously that international migrations are not
autonomous processes and, further, that some of the actors in the international
migration story are not usually recognized as such. Among these actors are, for
instance: i) multinational corporations through their role in internationalizing
production, with the associated displacement effects of local small-scale producers
and the establishment of linkages between the capital receiving and capital sending
countries involved; ii) governments through their military operations, with the
associated displacements of people and ensuing flows of refugees and migrants; iii)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures through their role in
mobilizing the poor into a desperate search for survival strategies that include
migration, whether domestic or international, as one option; and, iv) most recently, the
role of free-trade agreements through their strenghtening of cross-border flows of
capital, services and information, which include as one key component the cross-
border circulation of professional workers.
A key issue in the case of immigration policy is the absence of any recognition that
immigration may often be one of the trade-offs in these processes. There are a whole
range of trade-offs, positive and negative, in all of these flows – in direct foreign
investment, in off-shore manufacturing, in IMF austerity measures, in free trade
agreements. Frequently these trade-offs are recognized and formalized into the policy
framework. But immigration is never seen as one of the trade-offs – it simply is not part
of the map. Immigration policy continues to be characterized by its formal isolation
from other major policy arenas, as if it were possible to handle immigration as an
autonomous event.
Migrations are embedded in larger dynamics and they often are initiated through
the actions of key actors in receiving countries, whether governments or
corporations. If an immigration flow is initiated partly as a result of a receiving
country’s policies in other, non-immigration domains, would not immigration policy
gain from recognizing such interaction effects? What is gained by not recognizing
interaction effects?
Factoring in interaction effects is certainly complicated, certainly much more so than
pretending that immigration is simply the result of poverty and the acts of individual
immigrants. One version of such a recognition of interaction effects is to attach
immigration impact statements to policies that involve actions overseas likely to have
significant impacts on people and local forms of livelihood. A major example of this is
of course U.S. agribusiness introducing large scale commercial crops for export into a
country’s region where small holders were the local norm. The displacement of small-
holders and their subsequent transformation into a supply of wage-labour for large-
scale commercial agriculture sets the stage for labour migrations. This is a pattern that
we have seen repeat itself in many parts of the world, including the Caribbean and
Mexico, two important source countries for immigrants to the U.S.
While the concept of immigration impact statements might seem unpractical and
resemble an academic exercise, it is worth noting its evolution. Ten years ago, when I
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first wrote about this, such a concept was simply not conceivable even as a subject
for discussion. By 1992, the debate around the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) regularly included evaluations of the immigration impact,
particularly Mexican migration to the U.S. In an important and pathbreaking
1990 research report by the immigration office in the US Department of
Labour, we can find one of the first formal recognitions of the impact of U.S.
activities overseas on the formation of migration flows. Minor as they may
seem, these two cases represent an important opening in the wall of autonomy
built around immigration policy. When we look close to the ground, we can see
that the politics of immigration are opening up to the recognition of interaction
effects.
Economic globalization brings with it an additional set of factors for immigration
policy. It intensifies, multiplies and diversifies these interaction effects. If we accept, as I
have argued, that immigration flows are partly embedded in these larger dynamics,
then we may eventually confront the necessity of a radical rethinking of what it means
to govern and regulate immigration flows. Such a radical policy rethinking has been
worked out with trade through the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the creation of WTO. Such a policy rethinking is also
becoming evident in military operations, with the growing weight of international
cooperation, United Nations consent, and multi-lateral interventions. And it is being
done for telecommunications policy and other areas that require compatible standards
across the world.
What is important to emphasize here is that many of these areas are extremely
complex, that the policy re-formulation could not have been foreseen even a decade
ago, and, perhaps most importantly, that the actual changes in each of these domains
forced the policy changes. From where I look at the immigration reality – which is the
freedom of the scholar rather than the day to day constraints of immigration policy
makers and analysts – the changes brought about by the growing interdependencies in
the world will sooner or later force a radical re-thinking of how we handle
immigration. What is now experienced as a crisis in the state’s control over its borders
may well be the sign that we need to redraw the map within which we confront the
difficult question of how to regulate and govern immigration flows in an increasingly
interdependent world. Taking seriously the evidence about immigration produced by
vast numbers of scholars and researchers all over the world could actually help,
because it tends to show us that these flows are bounded in time and space and are
conditioned on other processes; they are not mass invasions or indiscriminate flows
from poverty to wealth.
2. More multilateralism at the regional level
As for the second property, unilateral sovereign action, globalization has had a
particular type of impact in forcing states to learn to be more multilateral. First, the
increase in international economic activity has brought with it an increase in
multilateral economic agreements. Global trade requires convergence in manufacturing
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and operational standards; global markets in finance require transparency and
international standards for accounting and financial reporting.2
A second important issue is the declining effectiveness and clout of unilateral state
action. Because a growing number of processes are today cutting across borders and
even becoming transnational, governments are increasingly at a disadvantage to
address some of today’s major issues unilaterally.3 This is not the end of national states,
but rather that the ‘exclusivity and scope of their competence’4 have changed, that
there is a narrowing range within which the state’s authority and legitimacy are
operative in a manner that excludes other actors. A third issue is the shrinking of the
range of cross-border policy arenas that can can be addressed from the exclusive
confines of the inter-state system narrowly defined. We are seeing a growing
institutionalization and formalization of systems of governance, especially for global
finance and business, which are not state-centered.5 It is an emerging supranational,
often semi-privatized framework that does not fit comfortably in older forms of the
inter-state system. This does not signal the end of the inter-state system as an important
space for cross-border processes. It is rather that the inter-state system is no longer the
only major institutionalized space for cross-border activities. A growing number of
cross-border economic activities can now take place without involving governments.6
This has forced the inter-state community to include non state actors in international
negotiations or international responses, and it has forced this community to be more
international in its approach rather than confining itself to being simply a collection of
national interests.
Reality has forced new conditions and new practices on the inter-state system. This
contributes to the internationalization of the inter-state system and may well set an
important precedent for handling other policy issues, including immigration, in a more
multilateral manner.
The growing tension between the growing pressures towards multilateralism and
internationalism on the one hand, and the ongoing insistence on unilateral action
when it comes to immigration issues has been partly resolved, in my analysis, through
the growth of de facto, rather than de jure, bi- and multilateralism in the handling of
specific aspects of international migrations.7
This is most evident and advanced in the case of Western Europe where the necessity
of multilateral approaches to immigration has been forced onto governments by the
requirements of formalizing an economic union. It is also evident in the negotiations
between the European Union (EU) and the Central European countries to institute
measures aimed at ensuring that asylum seekers stay in the country of first asylum in
Central Europe and not move on to the EU, as well as measures aimed at streamlining
the apprehension and return of unauthorized immigrants in Central Europe to prevent
them from going on to the EU. These are all conditions that require multilateral
action, no matter the rhetoric on sovereign power to act unilaterally.
Where the effort towards the formation of transnational economic spaces has gone
the farthest and been most formalized, it has become very clear that existing
frameworks for immigration policy are problematic.8 Current immigration policy in
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developed countries is increasingly at odds with other major policy frameworks in
the international system and with the growth of global economic integration. There
are, one could say, two major epistemic communities – one concerning the flow
of capital and information; the other, immigration. Both of these epistemic
communities are international, and each enjoys widespread consensus in the
community of states.
There are strategic sites in today’s global economy where it becomes clear that
the existence of two very different regimes for the circulation of capital and the
circulation of immigrants poses problems that cannot be solved through the old rules
of the game, where the facts of transnationalization weigh in on the state’s
decisions regarding immigration. The European Community and the national
governments of member states have found the juxtaposition of the divergent regimes
for immigration flows and for other types of flows rather difficult to handle. The
discussion, design and implementation of policy aimed at forming a European Union
make it evident that immigration policy has to account the facts of rapid economic
internationalization. The European Union shows us with great clarity the moment
when states need to confront this contradiction in their design of formal policy
frameworks.9
The other major regional systems in the world are far from that moment and may
never reach it. Yet they contain less formalized versions of the juxtaposition between
border-free economies and border controls to keep immigrants out. NAFTA is one
such instance, as are, in a more diffuse way, various initiatives for greater economic
integration in the Western Hemisphere. A recent proposal to check trucks at the
border between Mexico and the U.S. as part of drug-trade policing, with an
immigration control component, ran into enormous complaints from Mexico-U.S.
trade-related parties, arguing that it would have disastrous consequences for free-trade
in the region. It illustrates at a micro-level, the tension between the existence of
different regimes for cross-border flows.
3. A changed state in a changed environment
As for the third feature of the immigration framework, firstly, by its taking the state as a
given, a number of transformations signal that the state itself may well have changed in
some of its characteristics and, secondly, that it is subject to judicial scrutiny to an
extent not known before. To keep on formulating immigration policy as if the state
were the same, a sort of background factor, may not be the most enlightened or
effective way to proceed. Further, to make expanded police action a key part of new
immigration measures and to exempt those actions from judicial review at a time when
judicial review and individual rights have also strengthened, is a formula for expanding
litigation against the state rather than making the state more effective in its attempt to
regulate immigration.10
The state has been altered in several of its key features. There are the changed
international environments within which states operate today, as discussed above, and
there is the transfer of state functions to supranational organizations, to the private
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corporate sector through privatization and deregulation, and to the citizenry through
the expansion of judicial review and administrative law.11
There is an incipient unbundling of the exclusive authority of the state over its territory
that we have long associated with the nation-state. Further, some components of
sovereignty have been relocated to supranational entities, most importantly the EU
and WTO. There is no doubt that some of the intellectual technology that
governments have and that allow them to control their populations and their territory,
has now shifted to non-state institutions. This is illustrated in the new privatized
transnational regimes for cross-border business and the growing power of the logic of
the global capital market over national economic policy.12
The new special regimes for the circulation of service workers within the framework of
GATT and NAFTA have been uncoupled from any notion of migration, even though
they represent in fact, a version of temporary labour migration. Whether in the
NAFTA or in the GATT, it is a regime for labour mobility which is in good part,
under the oversight of supranational entities such as WTO that are quite autonomous
from governments.13 We can see here the elements of a privatization of certain aspects
of the regulation of cross-border labour mobility. It becomes part of the larger
institutional reshuffling of some of the components of sovereign power over entry, and
can be seen as an extension of the general set of processes whereby state sovereignty is
partly being decentered onto other non- or quasi-governmental entities for the
governance of the global economy.
In some ways, this can be seen as yet another instance of the privatization of that which
is profitable and manageable. The privatization of what were once public sector firms
is clearly a growing trend in a growing number of countries. But we are also seeing the
privatizing of what was once government policy in several emergent cross-border legal
and regulatory regimes for international business, notably the rapid growth of
international commercial arbitration and the growing importance of credit rating
agencies. And we can, as I have argued elsewhere,14 see NAFTA and GATT as
containing a venue for the privatizing of components of immigration policy that are
characterized by high-value added (i.e. persons with high levels of education and/or
capital) manageability (they are likely to be temporary migrants and working in leading
sectors of the economy and hence, visible migrants, subject to effective regulation) and
benefits (given the new ideology of free trade and investment). At the limit,
governments might be left with the supervision of the ‘difficult’ and ‘low-value added’
components of immigration – poor, low-wage workers, refugees, dependents, and
potentially controversial brain-drain flows. This can clearly have a strong impact on
what comes to be seen as the category ‘immigrant’, with the attendant policy and
broader political implications.
The invocation of international covenants, particularly human rights instruments to
make national policy, signals yet another type of relocation of government functions: a
relocation of some components of the legitimation process out of the national state and
onto international agreements. This is a move away from statism – the absolute
right of states to represent their people in international law and international relations
– towards a conceptual and operational opening for the emergence of other subjects of,
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and actors in, international law.15 The international human rights regime has been
a key mechanism for making subjects out of those hitherto invisible in international law
– first-nation people, immigrants and refugees, women. This has brought about a
growing number of instances where one sector of the state is in disagreement with
another. It is perhaps most evident in the strategic role that the judiciary has assumed
in the highly developed countries when it comes to defending the rights of immigrants,
refugees and asylum seekers.16
Finally, the growth of administrative law and the judicialization of politics also
represents a move away from statism, but on the domestic level. When it comes to
immigration, the courts have been used both in Western Europe and in the U.S.
to contest decisions taken by the legislatures. The strengthening of police (INS police)
authority in the regulation of immigration is not going to escape litigation. It is
an aspect of immigration policy that does not sit comfortably in the context of
individual rights and civil society which is such an important feature in these
countries.
The state itself has been transformed by this combination of developments. This
is partly because the state under the rule of law is one of the key institutional arenas
for the implementation of these new domestic and new international regimes –
whether the global rights of capital or the human rights of all individuals regardless of
nationality. And it is partly because the state has incorporated the objective of
furthering a global economy, as is evident in the ascendance of certain government
agencies, i.e. in the U.S. Treasury, and the decline of others, i.e. those linked to the
social fund.
Economic globalization and the human rights regime have altered the terrain within
which international relations among states take place and they have contributed to the
formation or strengthening of an international civic arena, from the world of
international business to that of international NGOs.17 Immigration today increasingly
intersects with these new worlds and is partly embedded in it, and in turn, partly
escapes sovereign state control.
These are transformations in the making as we speak. My reading is that they matter.
It is easy to argue the opposite: the state is still absolute, all of these are minor wrinkles.
But it may well be the case that they are the beginning of a new era. Scholarship on
mentalities has shown how difficult it is for people to recognize systemic change in their
contemporary conditions. Seeing continuity is much simpler and often more
reassuring.
Conclusion: Acting on the New Policy Landscape
Crucial to the possibility of innovative thinking on the immigration front is the need to
get over the sense of an immigration control crisis that prevails today in many of the
highly developed countries. One of the questions raised by these developments
concerns the nature of the control by the state in regulating immigration. The question
is not so much about the effectiveness of a state’s control over its borders – we know it
parallax
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is never absolute. It is rather, about the substantive nature of this control given the new
economic regime, international human rights agreements, the extension of various
social and political rights to resident immigrants over the last twenty years, the
multiplication of political actors involved with the immigration question, and so
forth.18 While a national state may have the power to write the text of an immigration
policy, it is likely to be dealing with a complex, deeply embedded and transnational
process that it can only partly address or regulate through immigration policy as
conventionally understood.
The fact that today there are a growing number of constraints on the state’s capacity to
handle the immigration reality, should not be seen as a control crisis. The type of
analysis developed in this article opens up the immigration policy question beyond the
familiar range of the border and the individual as the sites for control. It signals that
international migrations are partly embedded in conditions produced by economic
internationalization both in sending and in receiving areas. We need a more
comprehensive evaluation of what are the arenas and who are the actors in the world
of immigration today.
The perception of crisis is in some ways unwarranted, even though states have
less control than they would like because immigration is caught in a grid of other
dynamics. When we look at the characteristics of immigrations over time and
across the world, it is clear that these are highly patterned flows, embedded in other
dynamics which contain equilibrating mechanisms, that they have a duration
(many immigrations have lasted for twenty years and then come to an end); that
there is more return migration than we generally realize (e.g. Soviet engineers and
intellectuals who went back to Moscow from Israel; Mexicans who returned
after becoming legal residents through the IRCA amnesty program, feeling that
now they could circulate between the two countries). We also know from earlier
historical periods when there were no controls, that most people did not leave
poorer areas to go to richer ones, even though there were plenty of such differences in
Europe within somewhat reasonable travel distances. Finally, we know from a
diversity of types of evidence that most people do not want to emigrate to a foreign
country and that many who have would rather be circular migrants than permanent
immigrants.19
A key issue is whether national states have the capacity to pursue a broader
international agenda, one that goes beyond the furthering of economic globalization
and that adresses questions of equity and mechanisms for a better distribution of
resources allowing more people in poor countries to make a living. The last two
decades show us that international cooperation and multinational agreements are on
the rise. (About 100 major treaties and agreements on the environment have gone into
effect since 1972, though not all remain in force). And according to WTO, there are
currently 76 free-trade agreements in place. There is now also more multilateral
collaboration on crime; most recently the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has
been formed to confront new types of crimes in the realm of finance made possible by
digitalization. The complexity of the task is enormous since different countries have
very different traditions in terms of surveillance and permissibility, e.g. bribery. WTO,
the EU, and even such bodies as FATF, confront enormously complex policy issues
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that require enormous innovation.20 Clearly, multilateral approaches to cross-border
issues are growing.
Secondly, while the international role of the state in the global economic arena has to a
large extent focused on furthering deregulation, strengthening markets and pushing for
privatization, most states contain agencies and interests that go in other directions. For
instance, the participation of national states in the global environmental arena
has frequently led to the signing of multilateral agreements that aim at supporting
measures to protect the environment. That is not to say that they are effective; but
they do create a framework that legitimates both the international pursuit of a
common good and the role of national states in that pursuit.21 They represent a
countervailing force to the fact that the role of the state in the international economic
arena seems to be largely confined to pursuing the goal of maximizing the profitability
of certain economic sectors and actors, not even all sectors and actors, in its own
economy.
It is important to recognize that the state participated in the implementation of the
new global economic order.22 Global capital has made claims on national states and
these have responded through the production of new forms of legality. The new
geography of global economic processes, the strategic territories for economic
globalization, had to be produced, both in terms of the practices of corporate actors
and the requisite infrastructure, and in terms of the work of the state in producing or
legitimating new legal regimes. Representations that characterize the national state as
simply losing significance fail to capture this very important dimension. I view
deregulation not simply as a loss of control by the state but also as a crucial mechanism
to negotiate the juxtaposition of the inter-state consensus to pursue globalization, and
the fact that national legal systems remain as the major, or crucial instantiation
through which guarantees of contract and property rights are enforced. Can national
states also participate in the implementation of other cross-border frameworks to
govern other cross-border dynamics, such as those concerning development and
immigration?
The actual participation of more and more states in multilateral negotiations and the
growth of international regimes with various levels of formalization to handle
economic, environmental and even military issues, sets the stage for more
multilateralism in the handling of international migrations. Exploring such options
today is a more reasonable proposition than ten years ago, because it would harmonize
the handling of migration with the handling of other cross-border flows. Indeed, the
tenor of the times has already pressured states into more bi- and multilateral
collaboration than the formal rhetoric of statism signals. Aman, Jr. notes in his work on
the impact of globalization on administrative law, that it is in the interest of the state to
play an increasingly active role at the global level. The participation of national states
in new international legal regimes of this sort may contribute to the development of
transnational frameworks aiming at promoting greater equity.23
I am arguing for a new role by the state in immigration policy: more international and
more multilateral, including the participation of non-state actors. At the heart of this
type of multilateralism I see the necessity for sending and receiving countries to work
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together in the handling of international migration flows; the fact that some countries
are both receiving and sending migrants also calls for more collaboration on the part of
the various parties involved. This architecture of multilateralism would be centered on
regions and on the major cross-border migration flows they contain. Further, in the
longer term it is more likely that stronger legal regimes will develop on a global basis if
the global issues involved have a national regulatory counterpart. In the case of
immigration policy, this means a far broader range of innovations both in terms of the
new international environments within which states operate, and the new domestic
environments within which issues relating to individual rights and civil society have
become stronger. Given the ineffectiveness of much immigration policy and given the
undesirability of expanding police methods to control immigration, how much can be
lost by innovating in immigration policy? There has been an enormous amount of
policy innovation when it comes to the economy, and even the environment and
international military frameworks. We need to explore and realize the policy options
and constraints that emerge from the actual features of international migrations and
from the new global and domestic landscape for policy making.
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organizations are increasingly emerging as subjects
of international law and actors in international
relations. See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty
in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press,
1996).
17 The relocation of various components of sover-
eignty onto supranational or non-governmental
institutions brings with it a potential strengthening
of alternative subjects of international law and actors
in international relations, i.e. the growing voice of
nongovernmental organizations and minorities in
international fora. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism,
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Democracy, and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990). It also carries implications for
conceptions of membership (see, for example, From
Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants to
Europe, [ed] Rainer Baubock (Avebury: Ashgate,
1994) and Yasemin Nohog˘lu Soysal, Limits of
Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in
Europe (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1994)).
18 See, for example, Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets,
and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe.
19 For a full elaboration see Saskia Sassen, Guests and
Aliens.
20 By the end of 1996, FATF was composed of 26
nations, the European Commission and the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
21 See Ruggie’s work on multilateral agreements
regarding the environment.
22 An important question running through these
different interpretations is whether the new transna-
tional regimes and institutions are creating systems
that strengthen the claims of certain actors (corpora-
tions, the large multinational legal firms) and
correspondingly, weakening the position of smaller
players and states. In Multilateralism Matters: The
Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1993), Ruggie has
pointed out that the issue is not whether such new
institutions and major economic actors will sub-
stitute national states, but rather, the possibility of
major changes in the system of states.
23 Elsewhere in Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of
Globalization, I have discussed how an important
instrument such as GATT actually contains unde-
veloped potential for the development of arrange-
ments aimed at strengthening the community of
states, rather than simply the position of individual
states vis-a-vis each other. Can GATT and WTO,
become a more ‘public’ institution, one with greater
‘public’ functions? What matters for my purposes
here, is that firstly, even existing treaties contain
more incentives for joint state action or multilateral
initiatives than current practice indicates. Secondly,
they contain incipient rationales for the further
internationalization of national states and the inter-
state system.
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